Governance, Policy, and the Human Layer
Lesson 5: Governance, Policy, and the Human Layer
CC1 through CC5 and CC9 account for a large share of the Common Criteria, and they are not engineering problems. They are the questions: does leadership set the tone, is risk assessed, are controls monitored, are policies real, are people competent and supervised, are vendors managed, and can the business survive disruption. Companies that arrive at SOC 2 as a technical exercise lose weeks here β and it is the cheapest area to fix, because it is mostly writing things down and then actually doing them once a year.
The policy set
You do not need 40 documents. You need one approved, versioned information security programme policy plus a modest library of supporting policies, each with an owner, an approver, an effective date, a review cadence (annual is standard), and acknowledgements from staff. A typical set:
| Governance & people | Technology & operations | Risk & continuity |
|---|---|---|
|
Information security programme Acceptable use Code of conduct / ethics HR security (screening, onboarding, offboarding) Security awareness training Access control Confidentiality & NDA Whistleblower / anonymous reporting AI acceptable-use (increasingly expected) |
Change management Secure SDLC Encryption & key management Asset management Vulnerability & patch management Logging & monitoring Backup Physical & environmental security Data classification, retention & disposal |
Risk management Vendor / third-party management Incident response Business continuity & disaster recovery Privacy (if in scope) |
Policy hygiene is a real test. Auditors check the document's approval (board or executive), its date, whether the version in force during the window is the one you can produce, and whether employees acknowledged it. A policy revised in November does not govern June. If your practice differs from the policy, the policy is the specification you will be measured against β so write down what you actually do, at the standard you can sustain, rather than an aspirational document you'll violate by February.
Governance structure
- A named security owner β a CISO, a head of security, or a fractional/consulting arrangement that is documented. Someone must be accountable for the programme, and that person must have authority and a reporting line.
- Oversight body β a security steering committee or equivalent meeting on a documented cadence with minutes; and board or independent oversight with periodic reporting. Minutes are evidence.
- Defined roles and responsibilities β an org chart, a control-owner matrix, and job descriptions that reference security duties where relevant.
- Competence and accountability β hiring standards, background checks where lawful and applicable, performance reviews, and a disciplinary process that is documented and understood.
The employee lifecycle is tested end to end
| Stage | Control | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Before hire | Background check per policy; confidentiality agreement signed | Screening record, signed NDA |
| Onboarding | Security awareness training within a defined window (often 30 days); policy acknowledgement; access provisioned from an approved request | Training completion report, acknowledgement log, access ticket |
| In role | Annual refresher training; performance review; acceptable-use adherence | Completion records, review forms |
| Role change | Access re-evaluated and adjusted, not accumulated | Change ticket showing removals |
| Offboarding | Access revoked on a defined SLA; assets returned; knowledge transfer | Offboarding checklist with timestamps |
If you use contractors or an outsourced support team, they are in scope with the same obligations. This is one of the most common description-vs-reality gaps.
Vendor and subservice management (CC9)
Maintain a vendor inventory with a tier (critical / high / low) based on data access and business dependency. For each higher-tier vendor: a pre-contract security review, contractual security and privacy terms (DPA, breach notification, subprocessor list), and an annual reassessment. For vendors that are themselves service organisations, collect and review their SOC report, note the CUECs, and record the review. βWe have their SOC 2 in a Google Drive folderβ is a file, not a control β the control is the documented review with a date and a conclusion.
Incident response and continuity
- Incident response plan β severity classification, roles, escalation, internal and external communications, legal/regulatory and contractual notification obligations and their clocks, evidence preservation, and a post-incident review with corrective actions tracked.
- Tested, not shelved. An annual tabletop exercise with a written record of participants, scenario, decisions and follow-ups. If you had a real incident during the window, that is fine β the finding is having no documented response, not having the incident.
- Business impact analysis identifying critical services and dependencies, feeding the BCDR plan with RTO/RPO targets, and an annual test whose results are retained.
- Vulnerability to people β phishing simulation is optional for the criteria but cheap insurance against the finding that training exists on paper only.
Monitoring and internal audit (CC4)
The criteria expect you to evaluate your own controls, not just run them. In practice: a control self-assessment or internal audit cycle covering the control set, results documented, deficiencies communicated to the responsible owner, and remediation tracked to closure with dates. Combine it with a management review of the security programme at least annually β metrics, incidents, risk changes, training completion, open findings β with minutes. This is also where you catch problems before the auditor does, which is the entire point.
π§ Knowledge Check
1. Your access-control policy states reviews happen quarterly. You performed two reviews in the 12-month window. What has the policy done to your position?
2. Which control satisfies multiple criteria at once and anchors the whole programme?
3. You store a critical vendor's SOC 2 report in shared drive. Is that sufficient vendor management?